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Abstract
This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global
coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique
equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously ﬁxed. We show that, by convey-
ing information, endogenous policy re-introduces multiple equilibria. Multiplicity obtains even
in environments where the policy is observed with idiosyncratic noise. It is sustained by the
agents coordinating on diﬀerent interpretations of, and diﬀerent reactions to, the same policy
choices. The policy maker is thus trapped into a position where both the optimal policy and
the coordination outcome are dictated by self-fulﬁlling market expectations.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C7, D8, E5, E6, F3.
Key Words: global games, complementarities, signaling, self-fulﬁlling expectations, multiple
equilibria, currency crises, regime change.
∗The suggestions of the editor, Nancy Stokey, and two anonymous referees greatly improved the paper. For helpful
comments, we also thank Daron Acemoglu, Andy Atkeson, Philippe Bacchetta, Gadi Barlevy, Marco Bassetto, Olivier
Blanchard, Ricardo Caballero, V.V. Chari, Eddie Dekel, Glenn Ellison, Paul Heidhues, Patrick Kehoe, Robert Lucas
Jr., Narayana Kocherlakota, Kiminori Matsuyama, Stephen Morris, Balazs Szentes, Jean Tirole, Muhamet Yildiz, Iván
Werning, and seminar participants at AUEB, Berkeley, Carnegie-Mellon, Harvard, Iowa, Lausanne, LSE, Mannheim,
MIT, Northwestern, Stanford, Stony Brook, Toulouse, UCLA, the FRBs in Minneapolis, Cleveland, and Boston, the
2002 SED annual meeting, the 2002 UPF workshop on coordination games, the 2003 CEPR ESSIM, and the 2003
SITE workshop. Email addresses: angelet@mit.edu, chris@econ.ucla.edu, alepavan@northwestern.edu.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Coordination failures are often invoked as justiﬁcation for government intervention; they play a
prominent role in currency attacks, debt crises, bank runs, investment crashes, and socio-political
change.
A vast literature has captured the role of coordination in models that feature multiple equilib-
ria.1 Morris and Shin (1998, 2000, 2003), however, have argued that equilibrium multiplicity is the
unintended consequence of assuming common knowledge of the payoﬀ structure: coordination on
multiple courses of action may not be possible when agents have diﬀerent beliefs about the underly-
ing fundamentals. In currency crises, for example, a unique equilibrium survives when speculators
have heterogeneous information about the willingness and ability of the monetary authority to
defend the currency.2
The comparative statics of the unique equilibrium suggest that policy instruments that aﬀect
agents’ payoﬀs can be used to fashion market behavior. For example, raising domestic interest rates,
restricting capital outﬂows, or borrowing reserves from abroad reduce the speculators’ incentive to
attack. Morris and Shin (1998) thus argue that, “in contrast to multiple equilibrium models, [their]
model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks.”
However, policy choices also convey information about the policy maker’s preferences, beliefs,
and intentions. A central bank may be most anxious to raise interest rates when it is fearful of a
large attack; conversely, not intervening may signal that the bank does not feel the need to take
a preemptive strike.3 Policy analysis therefore cannot be reduced to a simple comparative-static
exercise — the issue is whether the market will interpret an intervention as a signal of resolve or a
signal of distress.
This paper endogenizes policy in a global game of regime change that stylizes the role of coordi-
nation in applications.4 A large number of agents choose whether to attack a status quo. A policy
maker controls an instrument that aﬀects the agents’ payoﬀ from attacking and maintains the status
quo as long as the aggregate attack is small enough. In currency crises, regime change represents
1Examples include Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Obstfeld (1986, 1996), Katz and Shapiro (1986), Calvo (1988),
Cooper and John (1988), Cole and Kehoe (2000), Battaglini and Benabou (2003). See Cooper (1998) for a review.
2See Morris and Shin (1998). Similar arguments have been made for bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2000;
Rochet and Vives, 2004), debt crises (Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini, 2004), investment games (Chamley, 1999;
Dasgupta, 2003), and riots (Atkeson, 2000).
3The idea that policy is a signal about the type of the policy maker goes back at least to Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988)
and has been emphasized in the context of currency crises by Drazen (2000). This earlier work, however, does not
examine coordination environments: the market is modeled as a single agent.
4Global games are games of incomplete information that often admit a unique equilibrium surviving iterated
deletion of strictly dominated strategies; see Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for the pioneering contribution.
1devaluation; in bank runs, the collapse of the banking system; in revolutions, the overturn of a
dictator or some other sociopolitical establishment.
As in Morris and Shin, the policy maker’s willingness or ability to maintain the status quo
is not common knowledge, ensuring that the equilibrium would be unique with exogenous policy.
Policy choices however depend on the type of the policy maker and can therefore convey valuable
information to the market.
Our main result is that policy endogeneity leads to multiple equilibria. Diﬀerent equilibria are
sustained by the agents coordinating on diﬀerent interpretations of, and diﬀerent reactions, to the
same policy choices.
There is an inactive-policy equilibrium where agents coordinate on a strategy that renders
the aggregate attack insensitive to policy interventions, thus inducing the policy maker never to
intervene. In addition, there is a continuum of active-policy equilibria w h e r ea g e n t sc o o r d i n a t eo n
the level of intervention at which they switch from aggressive to lenient behavior. The policy maker
thus ﬁnds herself in a position where both the optimal policy and the regime outcome are dictated
by self-fulﬁlling market expectations — a form of policy trap that contrasts sharply with Morris and
Shin’s policy prediction.
In the benchmark model, the policy is common knowledge and serves as a public signal about
the type of the policy maker. Contrary to global games with exogenous public information (e.g.,
Morris and Shin, 2000; Hellwig, 2002), the informational content of this signal is endogenous and
diﬀers across equilibria. Nevertheless, one could argue that our multiplicity relies on the policy
being publicly observed. This is not the case: the same multiplicity holds in perturbations of the
game where the policy is observed with idiosyncratic noise.
Furthermore, multiplicity does not rely on the freedom to choose out-of-equilibrium beliefs. It
is present even if agents have precise knowledge about the type of the policy maker and can be
sustained in environments where beliefs are always pinned down by Bayes’ rule.
Finally, our result is also diﬀerent from the expectation traps of Chari, Christiano and Eichen-
baum (1998) and Albanesi, Chari and Christiano (2003). In that work, multiplicity originates in
the government’s lack of commitment and vanishes if, as in our setting, the policy maker moves
before the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents
the main results. Section 4 examines robustness to idiosyncratic noise in the observation of the
policy. Section 5 discusses alternative payoﬀ assumptions. Section 6 concludes. All formal proofs
are in the Appendix.
22 The Model
Actions and payoﬀs. There are two possible regimes, a status quo and an alternative. A
continuum of agents of measure one, indexed by i and uniformly distributed over [0,1],c h o o s e
whether to attack (i.e., take an action that favors regime change) or abstain from attacking (i.e.
take an action that favors the status quo).
Let r ∈ [r, ¯ r] ⊂ (0,1) denote the opportunity cost of attacking and D ∈ {0,1} the regime
outcome. The payoﬀ for an agent who does not attack is normalized to zero, whereas the payoﬀ
from attacking is 1−r in the event the status quo is abandoned (D =1 )and −r otherwise (D =0 ) .
Both r and D are controlled by a policy maker. As in Morris and Shin (1998), the payoﬀ
from maintaining the status quo is V (θ,A), where θ ∈ R i st h et y p eo ft h ep o l i c ym a k e r( t h e
“fundamentals”), A ∈ [0,1] t h em a s so fa g e n t sa t t a c k i n g ,a n dV a continuous function, decreasing
in A and increasing in θ, with V (0,0) = V (1,1) = 0. Hence, regime change is inevitable for θ<0;
the status quo is sound but vulnerable to a suﬃciently large attack for θ ∈ [0,1);a n dn oa t t a c k
can trigger regime change for θ ≥ 1. Finally, the cost of raising the policy to r is C (r), where C is
strictly increasing and Lipschitz continuous, with C (r)=0 .T h ep o l i c ym a k e r ’ sp a y o ﬀ is therefore
U =( 1− D)V (θ,A) − C (r).
Information and timing. The game has three stages. In stage 1,t h ep o l i c ym a k e rl e a r n sθ
and sets r. In stage 2, agents decide simultaneously whether to attack after observing the policy r
and receiving private signals about θ. Finally, in stage 3, the policy maker observes the aggregate
attack A and decides whether to maintain the status quo.
The initial common prior about θ is an improper uniform over R, whereas the signal that
agent i receives is xi = θ + σξi.5 σ>0 parametrizes the quality of private information and ξi is
idiosyncratic noise, i.i.d. across agents and independent of θ, with absolutely continuous c.d.f. Ψ
and density ψ.W ea l l o wt h es u p p o r to ft h en o i s et ob ee i t h e r[−1,+1] (bounded) or the entire real
line (unbounded) and denote with Θ(x) ≡ {θ : ψ(x−θ
σ ) > 0} the set of types that are compatible
with signal x. Bounded noise has the advantage that the freedom to choose out-of-equilibrium beliefs
vanishes in the limit: Θ(x) → {x} as σ → 0 and hence an agent with signal x attaches probability
one to θ = x no matter the strategy of the policy maker and the observed r. Unbounded noise, on
the other hand, captures the possibility that agents may not be able to exclude any state.
To simplify the exposition, we let V (θ,A)=θ − A, in which case the policy maker ﬁnds it
sequentially rational to maintain the status quo if and only if A ≤ θ and hence her payoﬀ reduces
5By assuming an uninformative prior, we bias the results against multiplicity and ensure that the equilibrium is
unique with exogenous r for any σ>0.
3to U(θ,r,A)=m a x{0,θ− A}−C (r).6 For future reference, we also deﬁne x = −σ and x =1+σ
if ξ is bounded, x = −∞ and x =+ ∞ if ξ is unbounded, ˜ θ =1−r ∈ (0,1) and ˜ r = C−1(˜ θ) ∈ (r,r].7
Equilibrium. We consider symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria. Let r(θ) denote the policy




the agent’s posterior belief that θ<θ 0 given x and r, a(x,r) the
probability of attacking, and A(θ,r) the aggregate attack.
Deﬁnition. An equilibrium consists of a policy function r(·), as t r a t e g ya(·) for the agents, and
posterior beliefs µ(·) such that:
r(θ) ∈ arg max
r∈[r,r]
U(θ,r,A(θ,r)) (1)




Θ(x) D(θ,A(θ,r))dµ(θ|x,r) − r] (2)







dx, D(θ,A)=1if A>θ ,D (θ,A)=0if A ≤ θ, and
r(Θ(x)) ≡ {r : r = r(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ(x)}.
Conditions (1) and (2) require that the policy choice in stage 1 and the agents’ strategies in
stage 2 are sequentially rational, while (3) requires that beliefs are pinned down by Bayes’ rule
along the equilibrium path. We also impose that out-of-equilibrium beliefs assign positive measure
only to θ ∈ Θ(x).
Remark. The deﬁning elements of the model are the signaling game in stage 1 and the
coordination game in stage 2; that stage 3 is strategic is not essential. As we discuss in Section 5,
the results extend to more general environments where the regime outcome is not a choice of the
policy maker.
3P o l i c y T r a p s
Suppose for a moment that the policy was exogenously ﬁxed at some r ∈ [r,r]. The game then
reduces to a standard global game with exogenous information structure, as in Morris and Shin
(1998, 2003).
Proposition 1 With exogenous policy, the equilibrium is unique: the status quo is abandoned if
and only if θ<1 − r.
6Without loss of generality, we assume that the policy maker maintains the status quo and that an agent attacks,
when indiﬀerent.
7Letting ˜ r = C
−1(˜ θ) presumes C (r) ≥ ˜ θ; if the latter is not satisﬁed, the results hold with ˜ r = r.
4To prove this result, suppose that the status quo is abandoned if and only if θ<θ ∗, for some θ∗ ∈
(0,1). An agent with signal x then expects regime change with probability µ(θ∗|x)=1−Ψ(x−θ∗
σ )
and ﬁnds it optimal to attack if and only if x<x ∗, where x∗ solves r =1−Ψ(x−θ∗
σ ). It follows that




and hence θ∗ must solve θ∗ = Ψ(x∗−θ∗
σ ). Combining the
two conditions gives θ∗ =1−r and x∗ =1−r +σΨ−1 (1 − r). Finally, iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies selects this as the unique equilibrium of the game (see Appendix).
The comparative statics of Proposition 1 suggest that the policy maker can fashion market
behavior and the regime outcome simply by undertaking policies that reduce the individual payoﬀ
from attacking: the higher is r, the lower x∗ and θ∗.
This argument, however, fails to take into account that policy choices convey information.
Consider for example the case of bounded noise. Since agents ﬁnd it dominant to attack for x<x ,
the size of attack is equal to one for θ<x− σ, no matter r, in which case it is dominant for the
policy maker to set r. Similarly, since agents ﬁnd it dominant not to attack when x>x, the policy
maker necessarily sets r also for θ>x+σ. Any policy intervention thus signals that θ is neither too
low nor too high — information that may interfere with the ability of the policy maker to control
equilibrium outcomes.
Our main result is that, not only may interventions convey information, but agents can co-
ordinate on multiple self-fulﬁlling expectations about the strategy of the policy maker and hence
about the informational content of the same policy choices. The policy maker is thus trapped into
a position where the best she can do is to conform to market expectations.
Theorem 1 With endogenous policy, there are multiple equilibria: the level of policy intervention,
the set of θ for which intervention occurs, and the range for which the status quo is abandoned, are
indeterminate.
We prove this result with Propositions 2 and 3 below.
3.1 Inactive-policy equilibrium
We ﬁrst construct a pooling equilibrium in which agents coordinate on a strategy a(x,r) that is
insensitive to r, thus inducing the policy maker never to intervene.
Proposition 2 There is an equilibrium in which the policy maker sets r for all θ, agents attack if
and only if x<˜ x, where ˜ x = ˜ θ + σΨ−1(˜ θ), and the status quo is abandoned if and only if θ<˜ θ.
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Figure 1: Inactive-policy equilibrium.
The construction of the inactive-policy equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1. Given the agents’
strategy, the status quo is abandoned if and only if θ<˜ θ, no matter r, where ˜ θ solves ˜ θ = A(˜ θ,r).
When r = r, b e l i e f sa r ep i n n e dd o w nb yB a y e sr u l ea n ds a t i s f yµ(˜ θ|x,r) >rif and only if x<˜ x. For
r 6= r, consider out-of-equilibrium beliefs that assign zero measure to types for whom the deviation
is dominated in equilibrium (whenever possible). Since the policy maker’s equilibrium payoﬀ is 0
for θ ≤ ˜ θ and θ − A(θ,r) > 0 for θ>˜ θ, any r>˜ r is dominated in equilibrium for all θ,i nw h i c h
case the only restriction is that beliefs have support Θ(x).Ad e v i a t i o nt os o m er0 ∈ (r, ˜ r), on other
hand, is dominated if and only if θ/ ∈ [θ0,θ00],w h e r eθ0 and θ00 solve θ0 = C(r0)=A(θ00,r):for θ<θ 0
the cost of r0 exceeds the value of maintaining the status quo, whereas for θ>θ 00 the attack faced
in equilibrium is smaller than the cost of r0. Since ˜ θ ∈ [θ0,θ00], beliefs may assign zero measure to
θ/ ∈ [θ0,θ00] whenever [θ0,θ00] ∩ Θ(x) 6= ∅ and at the same time satisfy µ(˜ θ|x,r) >ri fa n do n l yi f
x<˜ x, for all r. Given these beliefs, an agent who expects all other agents to follow the proposed
strategy, thus triggering regime change if and only if θ<˜ θ, ﬁnds its optimal to do the same. The
size of attack A(θ,r) is then independent of r, eliminating any incentive for policy intervention.
Clearly, any beliefs and strategies such that A(θ,r) ≥ A(θ,r) for any (θ,r) sustain policy
inaction as an equilibrium. The ones considered here have two advantages. First, the beliefs satisfy
a simple forward-induction argument as in Cho and Kreps’ (1987) intuitive criterion. Second, the
associated strategies are the limit of those that implement policy inaction when r is observed with
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Figure 2: Active-policy equilibrium.
3.2 Active-policy equilibria
Suppose now agents coordinate on a strategy a(x,r) that is decreasing not only in x but also in r.
In this case, raising r can decrease the size of attack and even preempt regime change. However,
the cost of intervention may exceed the value of maintaining the status quo for low θ; similarly, the
a t t a c kf a c e dw h e ns e t t i n gr may be too small to justify intervention when θ is high. This suggests
the existence of equilibria in which intervention occurs only for intermediate θ.
Proposition 3 For any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r], there is an equilibrium in which the policy maker sets r(θ)=r∗
if θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗] and r(θ)=r otherwise, agents attack if and only if x<xor (x,r) < (x∗,r∗),a n d
the status quo is abandoned if and only if θ<θ ∗,w h e r e
θ∗ = C (r∗),θ ∗∗ = θ∗ + σ[Ψ−1(1 −
r
1−rθ∗) − Ψ−1 (θ∗)],x ∗ = θ∗∗ + σΨ−1(θ∗). (4)
The construction of an active-policy equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2. When the agents
coordinate on the equilibrium strategy, it never pays to raise the policy at any r 6= r∗. Furthermore,






,w h i l ex∗ solves the indiﬀerence condition for the agents, r = µ(θ∗|x∗,r).
Combining these three conditions gives (4), while ensuring that the set of types who intervene is
non-empty puts an upper bound on the cost of intervention and hence on r∗.
Other strategies can sustain the same policy. For example, agents could coordinate on attacking
i fa n do n l yi fx<x whenever the policy maker does not conform to market expectations, that is,
whenever the policy is raised at some r 6= r∗. As with Proposition 2, the proposed strategies
are sustained by beliefs that assign zero measure to types for whom a deviation is dominated in
7equilibrium and are the limit of those in a perturbed game where beliefs are always pinned down
by Bayes’ rule (see Section 4.2).
Also note that the exact θ is never revealed in any of the above equilibria; the equilibrium
policy only makes it common certainty whether θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗] or θ/ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗].8 This type of common
certainty permits perfect coordination on not attacking when the policy is raised at r∗. As discussed
in the next section, however, such a form of perfect coordination is not essential for multiplicity.
Finally, contrast Proposition 2 with the case where a single “big” agent plays against the policy
maker. This agent recognizes that he can trigger regime change for all θ<1. When noise is
bounded, he necessarily attacks for x<1 − σ. As σ → 0, the status quo is thus abandoned if and
only if θ<1. In our coordination setting, instead, the regime outcome remains indeterminate for
any θ ∈ (0,˜ θ].
4 Idiosyncratic policy observation
The payoﬀ structure of the coordination game played among the agents depends on two variables,
θ and r. We have assumed that, while θ is observed with idiosyncratic noise, r is observed publicly.
Although this is a reasonable assumption for most applications, from a global-games perspective it
is important to consider perturbations that remove common knowledge of the policy.9
In this section, we consider two such perturbations. In the ﬁrst, the policy is observed with
small bounded idiosyncratic noise; in the second, the support of the policy signals does not shift
with the actual policy choice. In both cases, there is no public information about either r or θ.
The key diﬀerence from standard global games is the endogeneity of the information structure:
whereas the informational content of the private signals about θ is exogenously given, that of the
signals about r is determined in equilibrium. As we show next, this has important implications for
the determinacy of equilibria.
4.1 Bounded policy noise
Consider the following modiﬁcation of the benchmark model. In stage 2, each agent receives a
private signal zi = r + ηζi about the policy; η>0 parametrizes the precision of the policy signal
and ζi is noise, i.i.d. across agents and independent of θ and ξi, distributed over [−1,1] with
absolutely continuous c.d.f. Φ and density φ bounded away from 0.
8By “common certainty” we mean common p =1beliefs (Monderer and Samet, 1989).
9Another possibility is that r is observed with aggregate noise. This case may be relevant for some applications,
but is less interesting from a theoretical perspective, for it maintains common knowledge of the policy signal.
8Proposition 4 Multiplicity survives with small bounded policy noise.
(i) There is an inactive-policy equilibrium as in Proposition 2.
(ii) There exists rη >r , with rη → r as η → 0, such that, for any r∗ ∈ (rη, ˜ r], there is an
active-policy equilibrium as in Proposition 3.
In the inactive-policy equilibrium, an agent who observes a signal z ∈ [r−η,r+η] believes that
the policy was set at r and that all other agents also received signals z ∈ [r − η,r + η].A t t a c k i n g
i fa n do n l yi fx<˜ x is then sequentially rational for an agent who expects all other agents to do
the same. Moreover, the same strategy can be sustained for z>r+ η by beliefs that satisfy the
intuitive criterion.10
In an active-policy equilibrium, on the other hand, agents coordinate on attacking if and only
if x<xor (x,z) < (x∗,z∗), where x∗ is as in Proposition 3 and z∗ = r∗ − η>r+ η (for η
suﬃciently small). Since the size of attack is the same for all r<z ∗ − η, the policy marker never
sets r ∈ (r,r∗ −2η). Moreover, while the marginal beneﬁt of reducing r below r∗ is independent of
η, the marginal increase in the size of attack goes to inﬁnity as η goes to zero. Hence, for η small
enough, the policy maker sets either r or r∗. Similar arguments as in Proposition 3 then imply that
r∗ is optimal if and only if θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗].
Although r is not publicly observed, in an active-policy equilibrium the observation of z ∈
[r−η,r+η]∪[r∗−η,r∗+η] generates common certainty on whether r = r or r = r∗, and hence on
whether θ is extreme or intermediate. This however is not a consequence of bounded noise alone: if
the equilibrium policy had no discontinuities, no policy choice would ever lead to common certainty
about either r or θ.
4.2 Unbounded policy noise
One may argue that multiplicity survives with small bounded noise only because of the common
certainty generated by equilibrium policies. Moreover, agents can still detect deviations. As in
standard signaling games, one may thus argue that multiplicity relies on the freedom to choose
out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
To show that neither of the above is necessarily true, we consider the following example. The
private signal about the policy is z = wr +( 1− w)r + ηζ, where w is a binary variable assuming
10Note that this is a game with noisy signaling. Forward induction puts restrictions not only on the beliefs about θ
but also about r : if r ∈ [z −η,z +η] is dominated in equilibrium for all θ ∈ Θ(x), whereas there is r
0 ∈ [z −η,z +η]
that is not dominated for some θ ∈ Θ(x), then the prescribed strategy proﬁle should not rely on the agents assigning
positive measure to r.
9value 1 with probability ρ ∈ (0,1) and 0 otherwise, whereas ζ is distributed exponentially over
[0,+∞) and η>0. The noises w and ζ are i.i.d. across agents and independent of θ, ξ, and each
other. That ζ is exponential simpliﬁes the construction of equilibria by ensuring that, when the
policy takes only two values, their likelihood ratio conditional on z also takes only two values; w
then ensures that the support of the policy signal is Z =[ r,∞) for any policy choice.11 We also
assume that C is linear and ψ is log-concave and strictly positive over R. The combination of these
assumptions keeps the analysis tractable.
Proposition 5 Consider the noise structure described above.
(i) There is an inactive-policy equilibrium as in Proposition 2.
(ii) Any of the active-policy equilibria in Proposition 3 can be approximated by an equilibrium
in the perturbed game: for any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r),ε>0, and (η,ρ) small enough, there is an equilibrium
in which r(θ)=r∗ if θ ∈ [θ0,θ00],r (θ)=r otherwise, and the status quo is abandoned if and only if
θ<θ 0,w i t h|θ0 − θ∗| <ε ,|θ00 − θ∗∗| <ε ,a n d(θ∗,θ∗∗) as in (4).
Since any (x,z) is consistent with any (θ,r), beliefs are always pinned down by Bayes’ rule and
no policy ever generates certainty — either private or common — about the fundamentals. Hence, in
contrast to both the benchmark model and the bounded-noise case, agents can no longer perfectly
coordinate on not attacking whenever the policy is set suﬃciently high. Indeed, an agent necessarily
attacks when x is low enough, no matter z.
Nevertheless, agents can still coordinate on diﬀerent interpretations of, and diﬀerent reactions
to, the same idiosyncratic policy signals.
In an inactive-policy equilibrium, agents expect the policy maker never to intervene and interpret
variation in z as pure noise. They then condition their behavior only on x, thus making the aggregate
attack independent of r.
In an active-policy equilibrium, instead, an agent who observes a high z attaches high probability
to other agents also having observed high policy signals. Hence, if he expects other agents to play
more leniently when they observe suﬃciently high z, he ﬁnds it optimal to do the same. But how
high z needs to be for an agent to play more leniently — and therefore the optimal level of policy
intervention — depends again on market expectations.
In other words, whereas in the baseline model agents coordinate on the sensitiveness of their
strategies to the public signal r, now they coordinate on the sensitivity to the private signals z.
11The same multiplicity can be sustained when ρ =0 .
10Remark. The two noise structures considered above allow to sustain exactly the same type
of equilibria as in the benchmark model. Although this may not be possible with other noise
structures, the logic of multiplicity does not seem to be speciﬁc to these examples.
5 Discussion
The benchmark model assumes that the cost of policy intervention is independent of θ; it also
identiﬁes the strength of the status quo with the value the policy maker attaches to it. These
assumptions, however, might not be appropriate for some applications. Similarly, some policies
may improve upon the strength of the status quo instead of raising the agents’ cost of attacking,
as in the case of a central bank borrowing reserves from abroad.
To capture these possibilities, we extend the game as follows. The status quo is maintained
(D =0 )i fa n do n l yi fR(θ,A,r) ≥ 0,w h e r eR is continuous in (θ,A,r), strictly increasing in θ,
strictly decreasing in A, and non-decreasing in r,w i t hR(0,0,r)=0=R(1,1,r) for any r. When
D =0 ,t h ep o l i c ym a k e r ’ sp a y o ﬀ is given by U (θ,A,r), where U is continuous in (θ,A,r),n o n -
decreasing in θ, non-increasing in A, and strictly decreasing in r. When instead D =1 ,h e rp a y o ﬀ
is 0 if r = r and W (θ,A,r) < 0 if r>r .12 Finally, the agent’s net payoﬀ from attacking is 1−g (r)
if D =1and −g (r) otherwise, where g is non-decreasing in r, with 0 <g (r) ≤ g (r) < 1. The
benchmark model is nested with R(θ,A,r)=V (θ,A),U(θ,A,r)=V (θ,A)−C (r),a n dg (r)=r.
Let ˜ θ ∈ (0,1) and ˜ r ∈ (r,r) solve R(˜ θ,1−g(r),r)=0and U(˜ θ,0, ˜ r)=0 .13 Assume ﬁnally that ψ
is log-concave. The existence of an inactive-policy equilibrium as in Proposition 2 is straightforward;
the following generalizes Proposition 3.
Proposition 6 Consider the extension described above. For any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r), there is a non-empty
set Θ∗∗ and an equilibrium in which the policy is r(θ)=r∗ if θ ∈ Θ∗∗ and r(θ)=r otherwise and
the status quo is abandoned if and only if θ<θ ∗, where θ∗ =m i nΘ∗∗ ∈ [0,˜ θ).
Unlike the equilibria of Proposition 3, the set of fundamentals for which the policy maker
intervenes may now be the union of multiple disjoint intervals. For example, let R(θ,A,r)=θ−A
and U (θ,A,r)=θ − A − C (r,θ), where C (r,θ) is decreasing in θ for r>r . The equation
C (r,θ)=A(θ,r) may then admit multiple solutions corresponding to multiple indiﬀerence points
at which the policy maker switches between r∗ and r without facing regime change.
12Note that r does not aﬀect the boundaries of the critical region and r = r is optimal when the status quo is
abandoned. These assumptions simplify the proof of Proposition 6. We do not expect the multiplicity result to be
unduly sensitive to these restrictions.
13This presumes U(˜ θ,0,r) > 0 >U(˜ θ,0,r), i.e., that ˜ θ w o u l dl i k et oe s c a p er e g i m ec h a n g eb yr a i s i n gr.
11Moreover, there may exist equilibria in which the policy is raised to r∗ for all θ ≥ θ∗. Such
equilibria are sustained by the agents coordinating on attacking if and only if r<r ∗ no matter x,
and therefore require that the noise ξ is unbounded.14 Alternatively, it may be the lowest types in
the critical region who raise the policy. For example, if R(θ,A,r)=θ−A and U (θ,A,r)=V −C (r),
where V> 0 is a constant, then Θ∗∗ =[ 0 ,θ∗∗) for some θ∗∗ > 0.
A possibility not addressed by the above result is that the strength and the value of the status
quo are negatively correlated with each other — countries with the weakest fundamentals might be
those that suﬀer the most from a collapse of the currency or the banking system. We consider an
example in the online appendix (Section A1). We ﬁnd again multiple equilibria in which policy
intervention occurs for the lowest types in the critical region.
These results suggest that multiplicity is likely to extend to a variety of applications. At the
same time, the global-games methodology does not necessarily loose all its selection power.
This is most evident in the following example. As in the benchmark model, let R(θ,A,r)=
V (θ,A),U(θ,A,r)=V (θ,A)−C (r), and g(r)=r; but now assume VθA ≥ 0 and limθ→∞[V (θ,0)−
V (θ,1)] = 0, meaning that the cost of an attack is non-increasing in θ and vanishes as θ →∞ .
Suppose further that the noise ξ is unbounded and has log-concave density. These assumptions
ensure that suﬃciently high θ do not intervene, that there is at most one policy level other than r
played in equilibrium, and that the agents’ strategy is monotonic in x. We can then show that the
entire set of equilibrium outcomes is given by the equilibria of Propositions 2 and 3 (see Section
A2 in the online appendix).
The following predictions can thus be made irrespectively of the equilibrium played: ﬁrst,
the regime outcome is monotonic in θ and the status quo is necessarily maintained for θ>˜ θ;
second, policy interventions take place only for an intermediate region of types; and third, this
region vanishes as agents become perfectly informed (i.e., as σ → 0). In contrast, none of these
predictions are possible when θ is common knowledge: policy intervention and regime change can
then occur for any subset of the critical range.
We conclude that incomplete information may signiﬁcantly reduce the set of equilibrium out-
comes and possibly lead to interesting predictions despite multiplicity. These predictions however
are sensitive to the details of the payoﬀ structure and therefore can be appreciated only within the
context of speciﬁc applications.
14When the noise is bounded, it is dominant for the agent not to attack whenever x>¯ x and hence for the policy
maker to set r whenever θ>¯ x + σ. See the discussion of "one-threshold equilibria" in the working-paper version of
this article (Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan, 2003).
12Finally, for some applications of interest, θ may represent some underlying economic fundamen-
tals about which the policy maker has only imperfect information. In the online appendix (Section
A3) we show that multiplicity is robust to small bounded noise in the policy maker’s observation
of θ. The case of large noise is perhaps more interesting, for it may introduce novel eﬀects such as
strategic experimentation and learning. These issues however are beyond the scope of this paper
and are left for future research.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper endogenized policy in a global coordination game. We found that the possibility that
policy choices convey information leads to multiple equilibria where both the optimal policy and
the coordination outcome are dictated by self-fulﬁlling market expectations. Diﬀerent equilibria
are sustained by the agents coordinating on multiple interpretations of and reactions to the same
policy choices.
On the theoretical side, our results underscore the importance of endogenous information struc-
tures in global games. On the applied, they raise questions about the merits of certain policy
proposals.
Can a central bank prevent a ﬁnancial crisis by injecting liquidity, or will that be interpreted as
a signal of distress? And do IMF interventions ease debt crises, or might they do more harm than
good by revealing that country fundamentals are weak enough to require IMF aid? To address
these questions, one has to examine the informational role of policy.
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1Starting from θ0 ≡ 0, construct a sequence {xk,θk}
∞
k=0 by letting xk and
θk+1 be the unique solutions to r =1−Ψ(
xk−θk
σ ) and θk+1 = Ψ(
xk−θk+1
σ ). This sequence represents
iterated dominance from below: whatever the strategy of other agents, the posterior probability of
regime change is at least 1−Ψ(x−0
σ ) and hence it is dominant to attack for x<x 0; conditional on
others attacking when x<x 0, the probability of regime change is then at least 1−Ψ(
x−θ1
σ ) making
it dominant to attack for x<x 1; and so on. Moreover, this sequence is increasing and bounded
from above, which together with the continuity of Ψ implies that limk→∞(xk,θk)=( x∗,θ∗), where
13θ∗ =1−rand x∗ =1−r +σΨ−1 (1 − r) are the thresholds corresponding to the unique monotone
equilibrium. It follows that necessarily a(x,r)=1for all x<x ∗ and D(θ)=1for all θ<θ ∗. A
symmetric argument from above establishes that a(x,r)=0for all x>x ∗ and D(θ)=0for all
θ>θ ∗. QED
Proof of Proposition 2. When r = r, beliefs are pinned down by Bayes rule and, since the
observation of r is uninformative about θ,t h e ya r eg i v e nb yµ(θ|x,r)=1− Ψ(x−θ
σ ). Note that,
by deﬁnition of ˜ θ and ˜ x, µ(˜ θ|x,r) >rif and only if x<˜ x. When instead r>r , consider out-of-
equilibrium beliefs as follows. Let Θ(r) be the set of types for whom r is dominated in equilibrium:
Θ(r) ≡ {θ : U∗ (θ) >U (θ,r,Ψ(
x−θ
σ ))},w h e r eU∗ (θ) ≡ U(θ,r,Ψ( ˜ x−θ
σ )). For r>˜ r, Θ(r)=R;
for r =˜ r, Θ(r)=R\{˜ θ}; and for r ∈ (r, ˜ r), Θ(r)=( −∞,θ0) ∪ (θ00,+∞), where θ0 and θ00 solve
θ0 = C (r)=Ψ( ˜ x−θ00
σ ) and satisfy 0 <θ 0 < ˜ θ<θ 00 < ∞. Then restrict µ so that µ({θ ∈ Θ(x) ∩
Θ(r)}|x,r)=0whenever Θ(x) * Θ(r).15 If r =˜ r and ˜ θ ∈ Θ(x), in which case µ({θ = ˜ θ}|x,r)=1 ,
assume that type ˜ θ — who is indiﬀerent between maintaining and abandoning — is expected to
abandon with probability ˜ r. In all other cases, let µ(˜ θ|x,r) >ri fa n do n l yi fx<˜ x. Given these
beliefs, an agent who expects all other agents to follow the proposed strategy ﬁnds it optimal to
do the same. Since C is strictly increasing and the equilibrium A(θ,r) does not depend on r, any
θ then clearly ﬁnds it optimal to set r. QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Take any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r] and note that 0 <θ ∗ ≤ ˜ θ. When agents coordinate
on the proposed strategy, the status quo is abandoned if and only if θ<0 or (r,θ) < (r∗,ˆ θ), where
ˆ θ solves ˆ θ = Ψ(x∗−ˆ θ
σ ) and θ∗ ≤ ˆ θ ≤ θ∗∗ < −∞, with the equalities holding only for r∗ =˜ r.
First, consider the behavior of an agent. When r = r,b e l i e f sa r ep i n n e dd o w nb yB a y e s ’r u l e ,
since (4) ensures Θ(x) * [θ∗,θ∗∗] for all x. (When the noise is unbounded, this is immediate; when







and, by (4), µ(θ∗|x∗,r) >ri fa n do n l yi fx<x ∗. When r ∈ (r,r∗), the set of types for whom r is




and satisfy 0 <θ 0 <θ ∗ ≤ ˆ θ ≤ θ∗∗ <θ 00 < ∞. Then, take any beliefs µ such that µ(ˆ θ|x,r) >rif
a n do n l yi fx<x ∗ and µ({θ ∈ Θ(x)∩Θ(r)}|x,r)=0whenever Θ(x) * Θ(r). When instead r = r∗
and Θ(x) ∩ [θ∗,θ∗∗] 6= ∅, Bayes’ rule implies µ(0|x,r)=0 . Finally, for any (x,r) such that either
15With some abuse of notation, µ({E}|x,r) denotes the posterior probabiltiy of event E.
14r>r ∗ or r = r∗ and Θ(x) ∩ [θ∗,θ∗∗]=∅, in which case Θ(r)=Θ(x), take any beliefs such that
µ(0|x,r)=0if x ≥ x and µ(0|x,r)=1otherwise. Given these beliefs, the proposed strategy is
sequentially rational.
Next, consider the policy maker. Given the agents’ strategy, r is preferred to any r ∈ (r,r∗)
and r∗ to any r>r ∗. For θ<θ ∗, the payoﬀ from setting r∗ is θ−C (r∗) < 0 and hence r is optimal.
For θ ∈ (θ∗,ˆ θ),r ∗ is optimal, since r leads to regime change whereas r∗ yields θ − C (r∗) > 0.F o r
θ>ˆ θ, the status quo survives even if r = r, but since A(θ,r) >C(r∗) i fa n do n l yi fθ<θ ∗∗, it is
optimal to set r∗ for θ ∈ (ˆ θ,θ∗∗) and r for θ>θ ∗∗.
Finally, note that θ∗ ≤ θ∗∗ if and only if θ∗ ≤ 1 − r (= ˜ θ) and therefore an active-policy
equilibrium of the type considered above exists if and only if θ∗ ∈ (0,˜ θ], or equivalently r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r],
which completes the proof. QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .Since C is Lipschitz continuous, there is K<∞ such that |C (r) −
C (r0)| <K |r − r0| for any (r,r0) ∈ R2,w h e r eR ≡ [r,r]. We prove the result for η<¯ η, where
¯ η =m i n {(˜ r − r)/4;(1 − r)φ/K)} and φ =i n f ζ∈[−1,1] φ(ζ) > 0. With a slight abuse of notation, we
denote with µ({r = r0}|x,z) the posterior probability that an agent with information (x,z) assigns
to the event that r = r0 and with µ({θ ∈ Θ0,r = r0}|x,z) the joint probability that θ ∈ Θ0 and
r = r0.
Part (i). We prove that there exists an equilibrium in which r(θ)=r for all θ, agents attack if
a n do n l yi fx<˜ x, whatever z, and the status quo is abandoned if and only if θ<˜ θ.
Consider ﬁrst the agents. When z ≤ r + η, beliefs are necessarily pinned down by Bayes’ rule
and sequential rationality for the agents follows directly from the same arguments as in the proof
of Proposition 2.
When instead z>r+η, the prescribed strategy can be sustained with out-of-equilibrium beliefs
that guarantee that the equilibrium passes the intuitive criterion test. Let Θ(r0) denote the set of
types for whom r0 is dominated in equilibrium. For r0 > ˜ r, Θ(r0)=R; for r =˜ r, Θ(r0)=R/{˜ θ}; and







, where θ0 and θ00 solve θ0 = C (r)=A(θ00,r), with
A(θ,r)=Ψ( ˜ x−θ
σ ).16 For any (x,z), then let P (x,z)={r0 ∈ [z − η,z + η] ∩ R : Θ(x) * Θ(r0)}
denote the set of policies that are compatible with z and which are not dominated in equilibrium
for some θ ∈ Θ(x).
Take ﬁrst any (x,z) such that ˜ θ/ ∈ Θ(x), which is possible only when ξ is bounded. If P (x,z) 6=
16Note that for all θ ∈ [θ
0,θ
00],x>x . Hence, an agent with signals (x,z) with z>r +η w h ob e l i e v e st h a tr
0 >r+2η
and who expects all other agents not to attack, also ﬁnds it optimal not to attack. It follows that the minimum size
of attack for a type θ ∈ [θ
0,θ
00] w h os e t st h ep o l i c ya tr
0 ∈ (r +2 η,˜ r) is A(θ,r
0)=0 , which implies that r
0 is not
dominated in equilibrium.
15∅,t h e np i c ka n yρ ∈ P (x,z) and let µ be any belief that satisﬁes µ({r = ρ}|x,z)=1and
µ({θ ∈ Θ(x) ∩ Θ(ρ),r = ρ}|x,z)=0 . If instead P (x,z)=∅, then simply take any ρ ∈ [z −
η,z + η] ∩ R and any µ such that µ({r = ρ}|x,z)=1 . Note that ˜ θ/ ∈ Θ(x) implies that either
x<˜ θ − σ<˜ x in which case µ also satisﬁes µ({θ<˜ θ,r = ρ}|x,z)=1 ,o rx>˜ θ + σ>˜ x in which
case µ({θ<˜ θ,r = ρ}|x,z)=0 .
Take next any (x,z) such that ˜ θ ∈ Θ(x). If z ∈ (r + η,˜ r + η), then necessarily P (x,z) 6= ∅
since any ρ ∈ [z − η,z + η] ∩ (r +2 η,˜ r) is never dominated in equilibrium for θ ∈ [θ0(ρ),θ00(ρ)],
where θ0(ρ) and θ00(ρ) solve θ0 = C (ρ)=Ψ( ˜ x−θ00
σ ) and satisfy 0 <θ 0(ρ) < ˜ θ<θ 00(ρ) < ∞. Then,
take any ρ ∈ [z − η,z + η] ∩ (r +2 η,˜ r) and let µ be any beliefs such that µ({r = ρ}|x,z)=1 ,
µ({θ ∈ Θ(x) ∩ Θ(ρ),r= ρ}|x,z)=0and µ({θ<˜ θ,r = ρ}|x,z) >ρif and only if x<˜ x.I fi n s t e a d
z>˜ r+η, necessarily P (x,z)=∅. Then simply take any ρ ∈ [z−η,z+η]∩R and any µ such that
µ({r = ρ}|x,z)=1and µ({θ<˜ θ,r = ρ}|x,z) >ρif and only if x<˜ x. Finally, if z =˜ r + η, since
P (x,z)={˜ r} and Θ(x) ∩ Θ(˜ r)=Θ(x)/{˜ θ},t h e nl e tµ({θ = ˜ θ,r =˜ r}|x,z)=1 , and, as in the
proof of Proposition 2, assume this agent also expects ˜ θ to abandon the regime with probability ˜ r.
With the beliefs speciﬁed above, an agent who expects all other agents to attack if and only
x<˜ x for any z, ﬁnds it optimal to follow the same strategy.
Finally, since the size of attack does not depend on r, setting r(θ)=r for all θ is sequentially
rational for the policy maker.
Part (ii).L e t rη ≡ max{r +4 η, C−1(Kη/φ)} and note that rη is increasing in η, rη → r as
η → 0, and rη < ˜ r for any η<¯ η. Take any r∗ ∈ (rη, ˜ r] and let z∗ = r∗ − η and (x∗,θ∗,θ∗∗) as
in (4). We prove that there exists an equilibrium in which r(θ)=r∗ if θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗] and r(θ)=r
otherwise, agents attack if and only if x<xor (x,r) < (x∗,z∗), and the status quo is abandoned
i fa n do n l yi fθ<θ ∗.
Consider ﬁrst the agents. When z ∈ [r − η,r + η], beliefs are always pinned down by Bayes’
rule, since (4) ensures Θ(x) * [θ∗,θ∗∗] for any x. It follows that µ({r = r}|x,z)=1and







where ˆ θ ∈ (θ∗,θ∗∗) solves Ψ(x∗−ˆ θ
σ )=ˆ θ and x∗ is as in (4).
Take any z ∈ (r+η,r∗ −η). If Θ(x)∩[θ∗,θ∗∗] 6= ∅, pick any ρ ∈ (r+2η,r∗ −2η)∩[z −η,z+η]







, where θ0 and θ00 solve θ0 = C (ρ)=
Ψ((x∗ − θ)/σ) and satisfy 0 <θ 0 <θ ∗ < ˜ θ<θ ∗∗ <θ 00 < ∞, which implies that [θ∗,θ∗∗]∩Θ(ρ)=∅.
Then, take any µ that satisﬁes µ({r = ρ}|x,z)=1 , µ({θ ∈ Θ(x)∩Θ(ρ),r= ρ}|x,z)=0and µ({θ<
16ˆ θ,r = ρ}|x,z) >ρif and only if x<x ∗. If instead Θ(x) ∩ [θ∗,θ∗∗]=∅,then either P (x,z)=∅,
in which case simply take any ρ ∈ [z − η,r∗ − 2η] and any µ such that µ({r = ρ}|x,z)=1 , or
P (x,z) 6= ∅, in which case there must exist a ρ ∈ (z − η,r∗ − 2η) such that ρ ∈ P (x,z). Then
take any µ such that µ({r = ρ}|x,z)=1and µ({θ ∈ Θ(x) ∩ Θ(ρ),r = ρ}|x,z)=0 . Finally note
that Θ(x)∩[θ∗,θ∗∗] 6= ∅ implies that ξ is necessarily bounded and hence either x<θ ∗ −σ<x ∗ in
which case µ({θ<ˆ θ,r = ρ}|x,z)=1 , or x>θ ∗∗ +σ>x ∗ in which case µ({θ<ˆ θ,r = ρ}|x,z)=0 .
When instead z ∈ [r∗ − η,r∗ + η] and Θ(x) ∩ [θ∗,θ∗∗] 6= ∅, beliefs are again pinned down by
Bayes’ rule and satisfy µ({θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗],r = r∗}|x,z)=1 . When instead z ∈ [r∗ − η,r∗ + η] and
Θ(x) ∩ [θ∗,θ∗∗]=∅, then take any ρ ∈ [r∗,z+ η] ∩ R and any µ such that µ({r = ρ}|x,z)=1
and µ({θ<0,r = ρ}|x,z)=0for any x ≥ x so that attacking if and only if x<xis optimal.
Note that ρ>r ∗ is dominated in equilibrium for all θ ∈ Θ(x). Nevertheless, in this case, we do
not need to restrict beliefs to assign positive measure only to r ∈ P(x,z) and θ/ ∈ Θ(x) ∩ Θ(r),f o r
such restrictions would make the agents (weakly) more aggressive, thus making the deviation even
less proﬁtable for the policy maker.
Finally, for any z>r ∗ +η, since necessarily P (x,z)=∅, simply take any ρ ∈ [z −η,z+η]∩R
and any µ such that µ({r = ρ}|x,z)=1and µ({θ<0,r= ρ}|x,z) > 0 i fa n do n l yi fx<x .
Given these beliefs, the strategy of the agents is sequentially rational for any (x,z).





0 for r ≥ r∗
Ψ(x∗−θ
σ )Φ(z∗−r
η ) for r ∈ [z∗ − η,r∗)
Ψ(x∗−θ
σ ) for r ≤ z∗ − η
Clearly, r is preferred to any r ∈ (r,z∗−η) and r∗ is preferred to any r>r ∗ by all θ. The payoﬀ asso-
ciated to r∗ is θ−C(r∗), while the payoﬀ associated to any r ∈ [z∗−η,r∗) is max{θ − A(θ,r),0}−
C (r). Hence, r∗ is preferred to r ∈ [z∗ − η,r∗) i fa n do n l yi fC (r∗) − C (r) ≤ min{A(θ,r),θ}.
For any θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗],s i n c eθ∗ = C (r∗),C (r∗) − C (r) <θ ,implying that r∗ is preferred to
r ∈ [z∗ − η,r∗) i fa n do n l yi fC (r∗) − C (r) ≤ A(θ,r). Furthermore, since C (r∗)=A(θ∗∗,r)=
Ψ(x∗−θ∗∗
σ ), this is satisﬁed for all θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗] i fa n do n l yi f
C (r∗) − C (r) ≤ C (r∗)Φ(z∗−r
η ). (5)
By Lipschitz continuity of C and absolute continuity of Φ,C(r∗)−C (r) ≤ K (r∗ − r) and Φ(z∗−r
η )=
R (z∗−r)/η
−1 φ(ζ)dζ ≥ 1
ηφ[r∗ − r], whereas r∗ >r η implies K<C (r∗)φ/η. It follows that, for all
17r ∈ [z∗ − η,r∗),
C (r∗) − C (r) − C (r∗)Φ(z∗−r
η ) ≤ [K − 1
ηφC (r∗)][r∗ − r] < 0, (6)
w h i c hi nt u r ns u ﬃces for (5). Furthermore, since θ−C(r∗) ≥ max{θ−Ψ(x∗−θ
σ ),0} for all θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗],
r∗ is also optimal for all θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗].
Next, consider θ ∈ [0,θ∗). In this case, Ψ(x∗−θ
σ ) >θ ∗ >θand therefore min{A(θ,r),θ} ≥
θΦ(z∗−r
η ), so that the payoﬀ from setting r ∈ [z∗ − η,r∗] is
θ − min{A(θ,r),θ} − C(r) ≤ θ[1 − Φ(z∗−r
η )] − C(r).
Hence, for r to be optimal for any θ ∈ [0,θ∗),i ts u ﬃces that θ[1 − Φ(z∗−r
η )] − C(r) ≤ 0. But this
follows immediately from (6) using θ<θ ∗ = C (r∗).
Finally, consider θ>θ ∗∗. In this case, Ψ(x∗−θ
σ ) ≤ C(r∗) <θand therefore the payoﬀ from setting
r ∈ [z∗ − η,r∗] is smaller than the payoﬀ associated with r if θ − A(θ,r) − C(r) ≤ θ − Ψ(x∗−θ
σ ),
or equivalently Ψ(x∗−θ
σ )[1 − Φ(z∗−r
η )] − C(r) ≤ 0. Using Ψ(x∗−θ∗∗
σ )=C (r∗),t h i si ss a t i s ﬁed for all
θ>θ ∗∗ if and only if C (r∗) − C (r∗)Φ(z∗−r
η ) − C (r) ≤ 0 for all r ∈ [z∗ − η,r∗), which once again
follows by (6) when r∗ >r η. QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .Part (i). When r(θ)=r for all θ, z conveys no information about θ
and hence Pr[D =1 |x,z]=P r [ θ ≤ ˜ θ|x,z]=1− Ψ(x−˜ θ
σ ) and E[r|x,z]=r for any z. An agent
thus ﬁnds it optimal to attack if and only if x<˜ x, where ˜ x solves Ψ( ˜ x−˜ θ
σ )=1− r. T h es i z eo ft h e
attack is then given by A(θ,r)=Ψ( ˜ x−θ
σ ) and is independent of r, implying that the policy maker
indeed ﬁnds it optimal to set r(θ)=r for all θ and abandon the regime if and only if θ<˜ θ, where
˜ θ solves Ψ( ˜ x−˜ θ
σ )=˜ θ.
Part (ii). Let r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r). We prove that, for η small enough, there exist thresholds (θ0,θ00,x 0, ˆ x)
and an equilibrium such that the policy maker sets r(θ)=r∗ if θ ∈ [θ
0
,θ00] and r(θ)=r otherwise,
an agent attacks if and only if either x<ˆ xor (x,z) < (x0,z∗), where z∗ = r∗, and the status quo
is abandoned if and only if θ<θ 0.
Consider ﬁrst the agents. Since ζ is exponential (i.e., Φ(ζ)=1−exp(−ζ)), the likelihood ratio
of r∗ vs r conditional on z is ρ+(1−ρ)exp(
r∗−r
η ) for z ≥ z∗ and ρ for z<z ∗. The expected payoﬀ




− E[r|x,z], is thus
u(x,z)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1 − Ψ(x−θ0
σ ) − {r − (r − ρr∗)[Ψ(x−θ0
σ ) − Ψ(x−θ00
σ )]}
1 − (1 − ρ)[Ψ(x−θ0




σ ) − {r +[ r∗ρ + r∗(1 − ρ)exp(
r∗−r
η ) − r][Ψ(x−θ0
σ ) − Ψ(x−θ00
σ )]}
1+[ ρ +( 1− ρ)exp(
r∗−r
η ) − 1][Ψ(x−θ0
σ ) − Ψ(x−θ00
σ )]
for z ≥ r∗
(7)
Note that, for any z, u is continuous in x, u → 1−r > 0 as x →− ∞and u →− r < 0 as x → +∞.
Furthermore, for any x, u(x,z) is a step function in z, with discontinuity at z = r∗. It follows that
there exist thresholds x0 and ˆ x such that x0 solves u(x0,z)=0for z<r ∗ and ˆ x solves u(ˆ x,z)=0
for z ≥ r∗; equivalently,
1 − Ψ(x0−θ0
σ )=r − (r − ρr∗)[Ψ(x0−θ0
σ ) − Ψ(x0−θ00
σ )] (8)
1 − Ψ( ˆ x−θ0
σ )=r +[ r∗ρ + r∗(1 − ρ)exp(
r∗−r
η ) − r][Ψ( ˆ x−θ0
σ ) − Ψ( ˆ x−θ00
σ )]. (9)
Next, note that u(x,z)=N(x,z)/D(x,z), where N(x,z) and D(x,z) > 0 are respectively the
numerator and the denominator in (7). When z<r ∗, assuming ρ<r /r∗ suﬃces for N(x,z) to
be strictly decreasing in x and therefore for ∂u(x0,z)/∂x < 0. For z ≥ r∗, on the other hand, note







[r∗ρ + r∗(1 − ρ)exp(
r∗−r
η ) − r][Ψ(x−θ0





At x =ˆ x, necessarily H(ˆ x)=0 , which implies that ∂N(ˆ x,z)/∂x = H0(ˆ x) < 0 since ψ and (hence
1 − Ψ) is log-concave, and therefore ∂u(ˆ x,z)/∂x < 0. It follows that, given θ0 and θ00,x 0 and ˆ x are
the unique solutions to (8)-(9).
Consider now the behavior of the policy maker. When agents follow the strategies described
above, the size of attack is given by
A(θ,r)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
[1 − ρexp(−
r∗−r






η )+( 1− ρ)exp(−
r∗−r






σ )+[ 1− ρ + ρexp(−
r∗−r
η )]Ψ( ˆ x−θ
σ ) for r ≥ r∗
A(θ,r) is strictly decreasing in θ, equals A(θ,r∗) for any r ≥ r∗, and is strictly decreasing and
strictly concave in r ∈ (r,r∗). Together with the linearity of C, this implies that any r/ ∈ {r,r∗} is
19dominated by either r or r∗. For the proposed strategy to be optimal, it must be that the policy
maker prefers to set r = r and abandon the status quo for θ<θ 0,s e tr = r∗ and maintain for
θ ∈ [θ0,θ00], and maintain while setting r = r for θ>θ 00.
Let U1(θ) and U2 (θ) denote the payoﬀs from setting, respectively, r∗ and r while maintaining
the status quo:
U1(θ) ≡ θ − ρ[1 − exp(−
r∗−r
η )]Ψ(x0−θ
σ ) − [1 − ρ + ρexp(−
r∗−r
η )]Ψ( ˆ x−θ
σ ) − C(r∗)
U2(θ) ≡ θ − [1 − exp(−
r∗−r
η )]Ψ(x0−θ
σ ) − exp(−
r∗−r
η )Ψ( ˆ x−θ
σ ).
The two thresholds θ0 and θ00 must thus solve U1(θ0)=0and U2(θ00)=U1(θ00), or equivalently
θ0 = ρ[1 − exp(−
r∗−r
η )]Ψ(x0−θ0
σ )+[ 1− ρ + ρexp(−
r∗−r
η )]Ψ( ˆ x−θ0
σ )+C (r∗) (10)
C (r∗)=( 1− ρ)[1 − exp(−
r∗−r
η )][Ψ(x0−θ00
σ ) − Ψ( ˆ x−θ00
σ )]. (11)
Let q(θ) ≡ (1 − ρ)[1 − exp(−
r∗−r
η )][Ψ(x0−θ
σ ) − Ψ( ˆ x−θ
σ )]. Since ˆ x<x 0, the distribution 1 − Ψ(x0−θ
σ )
ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the distribution 1 − Ψ( ˆ x−θ
σ ). It follows that ψ(x0−θ
σ )/ψ( ˆ x−θ
σ ) is
increasing in θ,implying that there exists a unique ˆ θ such that ψ(x0−θ
σ ) S ψ( ˆ x−θ
σ ) if and only if θ S ˆ θ;
equivalently, q(θ) is increasing for θ<ˆ θ and decreasing for θ>ˆ θ. Furthermore, limθ→−∞ q(θ)=
limθ→+∞ q(θ)=0and therefore (11) admits at most two solutions.
To sustain the proposed equilibrium, θ0 must be between the two solutions, θ1 and θ2, of (11).
Indeed, provided that θ0 ∈ [θ1,θ2],U 1(θ) ≥ U2(θ) i fa n do n l yi fθ ∈ [θ1,θ2] and U1(θ) ≥ 0 if and
only if θ ≥ θ0; since U1 and U2 are increasing in θ, the strategy for the policy maker is then optimal
with θ00 = θ2. If instead θ0 <θ 1, setting r∗ would not be optimal for θ ∈ [θ0,θ1); and if θ0 >θ 2,r ∗
would never be optimal. Finally, note that θ0 ∈ [θ1,θ2] i fa n do n l yi f
C(r∗) ≤ (1 − ρ)[1 − exp(−
r∗−r
η )][Ψ(x0−θ0
σ ) − Ψ( ˆ x−θ0
σ )]. (12)
The following lemma completes the proof by showing that, for η small enough, the proposed
equilibrium exists and is close to the corresponding one in the game without policy noise.
Lemma. For any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r) and ε>0, there exist ¯ η>0 and ¯ ρ<r /r∗ such that for any
(η,ρ) < (¯ η,¯ ρ), equations (8), (9), (10) and (11) admit a solution (x0, ˆ x,θ0,θ00) that satisﬁes (12),
θ0 ≤ θ00, |x0 − x∗| <ε ,
¯ ¯θ0 − θ∗¯ ¯ <ε ,
¯ ¯θ00 − θ∗∗¯ ¯ <εand ˆ x<−1/ε.
20Proof. Let
W = Ψ( ˆ x−θ0
σ ),Z = Ψ( ˆ x−θ00
σ ),Y = Ψ(x0−θ00
σ ), (13)
Conditions (8)-(11) can then be rewritten as follows:
δ − γY = Ψ
¡
Ψ−1 (Y ) − Ψ−1 (Z)+Ψ−1 (W)
¢
(14)
W = α + βZ (15)










+ W + C(r∗) (16)
Y = Z +
C (r∗)




















Note that α,β,δ ∈ (0,1) and γ>0. Substituting (15) into (14) gives
Ψ−1 (δ − γY) − Ψ−1 (Y )=Ψ−1 (α + βZ) − Ψ−1 (Z). (18)
Let LHS(Y ) and RHS(Z) denote, respectively, the left-hand and the right-hand side of (18). Note
that LHS(Y ) and RHS(Z) are deﬁned for Y ∈ (0,min{1,δ/γ}) and Z ∈ (0,1) and are continuous in
Y and Z. Moreover, LHS is decreasing in Y ,w i t hlimY →0 LHS(Y )=∞, limY →min{1,δ/γ} LHS(Y )=
−∞ and LHS(Y ) T 0 if and only if Y S 1−r,w h e r e a slimZ→0 RHS(Z)=∞, limZ→1 RHS(Z)=
−∞, and RHS(Z) T 0 if and only if Z S 1 − r. It follows that (18) deﬁnes implicitly a continu-
ous function Y = g(Z;η,ρ), with g :( 0 ,1) × R2 → (0,min{1,δ/γ});n o t et h a tlimZ→0 g(Z)=0 ,
limZ→1 g(Z)=m i n {1,δ/γ},a n dg(Z) S 1 − r if and only if Z S 1 − r. Condition (17), on the
other hand, deﬁnes explicitly a function Y = f (Z;η,ρ).
We want to prove that (17) and (18), or equivalently Y = f(Z)=g(Z), admit a solution for
(Y,Z).N o t e t h a t f(Z;η,ρ) is continuous and increasing in (Z,η,ρ) with f(0;η,ρ) → C (r∗) ∈
(0,1−r) as (η,r) → (0,0). Then, take any (η0,ρ 0,Z 0) such that f(Z0;η0,ρ 0) < 1−r,a n dn o t et h a t
g(Z;η,ρ) is also continuous in (Z,η,ρ) with g(Z0;η,ρ) → 1−r as η → 0 and g(Z;η,ρ) → 0 for any
(η,ρ) as Z → 0. It follows that there exist ˜ η ∈ (0,η0), ˜ ρ<min{ρ0,r/r∗} and Z1 <Z 0 such that
for any (η,ρ) < (˜ η,˜ ρ),g (Z0;η,ρ) >f(Z0;η,ρ) and g(Z1;η,ρ) <f(Z1;η,ρ). The graphs of g and f
thus intersect at least twice for (η,ρ) suﬃciently small, implying that the system Y = f(Z)=g(Z)
admits at least two solutions, as illustrated in Figure A1.












Consider the lowest solution (Z∗,Y∗),l e tW∗ = α + βZ∗ and note that (Z∗,Y∗,W∗) are
continuous in (η,ρ) and satisfy Z∗ ∈ (0,1 − r),Y ∗ ∈ (Z∗,1 − r) and W∗ ∈ (Z∗,1 − r). The
thresholds (x0, ˆ x,θ0,θ00) are then the unique solutions to (13) and (16). That W∗ >Z ∗ and Y ∗ >
Z∗ imply that 0 <θ 0 <θ 00. It remains to show that for η and ρ suﬃciently small (12) is also
satisﬁed, in which case U2(θ0) <U 1(θ0)=0and hence θ0 <A (θ0,r) < 1. Using Ψ(x0−θ0
σ )=
Ψ(Ψ−1 (Y ∗) − Ψ−1 (Z∗)+Ψ−1 (W∗)) and (14), we then have that Ψ(x0−θ0
σ )=δ − γY ∗ and hence
Ψ(x0−θ0
σ ) − Ψ( ˆ x−θ0
σ )=δ − γY ∗ − W∗. Moreover, as (η,ρ) → (0,0),Z ∗ → 0,Y∗ → C(r∗),W ∗ → 0,




η ) → 0, implying that
(1 − ρ)[1 − exp(−
r∗−r
η )][Ψ(x0−θ0
σ ) − Ψ( ˆ x−θ0
σ )] → 1 −
r
1−rC(r∗).
But since C(r∗) < 1 − r, then necessarily 1 −
r
1−rC(r∗) > 1 − r >C (r∗), which implies that there
exists η0 ∈ (0,˜ η) and ρ0 ∈ (0,˜ ρ), such that for any (η,ρ) < (η0,ρ 0), the solution to (8), (9), (10) and
(11) satisﬁes (12).
Finally, note that as (η,ρ) → (0,0),Y ∗ → C(r∗),W ∗ → 0, and Z∗ → 0. Using (13), (16) and
(8), we then have that θ0 → C (r∗), ˆ x = θ0 +σΨ−1 (W) →− ∞ ,x 0 → x∗, and θ00 → θ∗∗. Hence, for
any ε>0,t h e r ee x i s t¯ η ∈ (0,η0) and ¯ ρ ∈ (0,ρ 0) such that (η,ρ) < (¯ η,¯ ρ) suﬃces for |x0 − x∗| <ε ,
¯ ¯θ0 − θ∗¯ ¯ <ε ,
¯ ¯θ00 − θ∗∗¯ ¯ <εand ˆ x<−1/ε, where (x∗,θ∗,θ∗∗) are deﬁned as in Proposition (3). ¤
QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .We prove the result in three steps. The construction of an equilibrium
in which the policy is raised if and only if θ ∈ Θ∗∗ is in step 3; steps 1 and 2 characterize the set
Θ∗∗ and establish conditions that are useful for step 3.
22Step 1. Fix r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r) and let θ∗ =m i n {θ : R(θ,0,r∗) ≥ 0 and U (θ,0,r∗) ≥ 0} =m i n {θ ≥ 0:




































Step 2 below shows that either there exists an x∗ ∈ R such that m(x∗,x ∗)=g (r), or m(x,x) >
g (r) for all x, in which case we let x∗ = ∞. In either case, let Θ∗∗ = S (x∗).
θ∗ i st h el o w e s tt y p ew h oi sw i l l i n gt or a i s et h ep o l i c ya tr∗ if this ensures that no agent attacks.
S (x) is the set of θ ≥ θ∗ who prefer r∗ to r when agents do not attack when r = r∗ and attack
if and only if their signal is less than x when r = r. m(x,x0) in turn is the posterior probability
of regime change for an agent with signal x0 when he observes r and believes that the regime is
abandoned if and only if θ<θ ∗ and that the policy is r(θ)=r i fa n do n l yi fθ/ ∈ S (x). The
triplet (x∗,θ∗,Θ∗∗) thus identify an equilibrium for the ﬁctitious game in which the policy maker is
restricted to set r ∈ {r,r∗} and the agents are restricted not to attack when r = r∗. Step 3 shows
that this is also part of an equilibrium for the unrestricted game.
Step 2. Note that S (x) is continuous in x and S (x1) ⊆ S (x2) for any x1 ≤ x2 (because





continuous in x), whereas m(x,x0) is continuous in (x,x0), non-decreasing in x (by the monotonicity
of S) and non-increasing in x0 (by the log-concavity of ψ). Moreover, for any (x,x0) ∈ R2, we have













≥ 1 − Ψ(x0−θ∗
σ ).







Deﬁne now the sequence {xk}
∞
k=0 , with xk ∈ R ∪ {+∞}, as follows: for k =0 , let x0 = x#; for
k ≥ 1, let xk be the solution to m(xk−1,x k)=g (r) if xk−1 < ∞ and inf {x0 : m(xk−1,x 0) ≤ g (r)} <
∞, and xk = ∞ otherwise. The fact that m
¡
x#,x #¢
≥ 1 − Ψ(x#−θ∗
σ )=g (r), together with the
continuity and monotonicities of m, ensures that this sequence is well deﬁned and non-decreasing. It
follows that either limk→∞ xk ∈ [x#,+∞), or limk→∞ xk =+ ∞. In the former case, let x∗ =l i mxk
and Θ∗∗ = S (x∗);in the latter, let x∗ = ∞ and Θ∗∗ = S (∞) ≡ ¯ S.
23Note that θ∗ ∈ [0,˜ θ) and x∗ > ˆ x, where ˆ x ∈ R is the solution to R(θ∗,Ψ((ˆ x − θ∗)/σ),r)=0 .
That θ∗ < ˜ θ follows immediately from r∗ < ˜ r and hence U(˜ θ,0,r∗) >U (˜ θ,0, ˜ r)=0 . To see that
x∗ > ˆ x,n o t et h a t ,b yt h ed e ﬁnitions of ˆ x, ˜ θ, and x#,R (θ∗,Ψ(x#−θ∗
σ ),r)=0=R(˜ θ,1 − g(r),r)=
R(˜ θ,Ψ(x#−θ∗
σ ),r), which together with θ∗ < ˜ θ implies x# > ˆ x and therefore x∗ ≥ x# > ˆ x.
This in turn implies that there exists a ˆ θ ∈ (θ∗,1) which solves R(ˆ θ,Ψ(x#−θ∗
σ ),r)=0such that
R(θ,Ψ(x#−θ∗
σ ),r) < 0 if and only if θ<ˆ θ.B u tt h e n[θ∗,ˆ θ) ⊆ S(x∗).
Finally, note that, when the noise is bounded, m(x,x0)=0for all x0 ≥ θ∗ + σ, and S (x) ⊆
[θ∗,x+σ] if x+σ ≥ θ∗ and S (x)=∅ otherwise. It follows that, with bounded noise, x∗ <θ ∗ +σ,
Θ∗∗ ⊆ [θ∗,θ∗ +2 σ], and ˆ θ ∈ (θ∗,θ∗ +2 σ).
Step 3. Deﬁne the function X :[ r,r] → R ∪ {±∞} as follows: at r = r, let X (r)=x∗; for r ∈
(r,r∗), let X (r)=∞ if x∗ = ∞ and otherwise let X (r) ≥ x∗ be the solution to R(ˆ θ,Ψ(
X(r)−ˆ θ
σ ),r)=
0; ﬁnally, for r ∈ [r∗,r], let X (r)=x. We now show that the following strategies are part of an
equilibrium: the policy maker sets r(θ)=r∗ for θ ∈ Θ∗∗ and r(θ)=r otherwise; an agent attacks
i fa n do n l yi fx<X(r).
Consider ﬁrst the policy maker. By construction of X (r), for any r<r ∗,A (θ,r) ≥ A(θ,r)
and sign{R(θ,A(θ,r),r)} = sign{R(θ,A(θ,r),r)}, whereas for any r ≥ r∗, A(θ,r)=A(θ,r∗)
and sign{R(θ,A(θ,r),r)} = sign{R(θ,A(θ,r∗),r∗)}. It follows that the policy maker strictly
prefers r to any r ∈ (r,r∗) and r∗ to any r>r ∗. For any θ<θ ∗, R(θ,A(θ,r),r) < 0 and
U (θ,0,r∗) < 0, which implies that any θ<θ ∗ ﬁnds it optimal to set r and then face regime change.
On the contrary, any θ>θ ∗, necessarily maintains the status quo, since setting r∗ guarantees that
R(θ,0,r∗) > 0 and U (θ,0,r∗) > 0.B yd e ﬁnition of S, Θ∗∗ = S (x∗) is then the set of types above
θ∗ w h op r e f e rt or a i s et h ep o l i c ya tr∗ than setting r. We thus conclude that r(θ)=r∗ if θ ∈ Θ∗∗
and r(θ)=r otherwise is indeed optimal for the policy maker.
Consider next the agents. Given r = r, beliefs are necessarily pinned down by Bayes rule
since any x is consistent with either (−∞,θ∗) or (θ∗,+∞)\Θ∗∗;t h i si si m m e d i a t ei nt h ec a s eo f
unbounded noise and is ensured by the fact that Θ∗∗ ⊆ [θ∗,θ∗ +2 σ] in the case of bounded noise.











and is decreasing in x.M o r e o v e r ,b yd e ﬁnition of x∗, either x∗ < +∞ and m(x∗,x ∗)=g (r), or
x∗ =+ ∞ in which case the probability of regime change is m(x∗,x) ≥ g (r) for all x. Hence, given
r, it is indeed optimal to attack if and only if x<x ∗. When instead r = r∗, Bayes’s rule implies
24µ(θ∗|x,r∗)=0for any x such that Θ(x) ∩ Θ∗∗ 6= ∅, in which case it is optimal not to attack.
For out-of-equilibrium events, we follow a construction similar to that in Proposition 3. The
set of types for whom a deviation r/ ∈ {r,r∗} is dominated in equilibrium is Θ(r)=( −∞,0]∪{θ ≥
0:U(θ,0,r) <U ∗ (θ)}, where U∗ (θ)=m a x {0,U(θ,A(θ,r(θ)),r(θ))} denotes the equilibrium
payoﬀ. For any r ∈ (r,r∗), in which case [θ∗,ˆ θ) ⊆ Θ(r), take any µ such that µ(ˆ θ|x,r) >g(r) if and
only if x<X(r).I fx<X (r), we also restrict µ({θ ∈ Θ(x) ∩ Θ(r)}|x,r)=0when Θ(x) * Θ(r).
If instead x ≥ X(r), we do not need to impose such a restriction, for it would only make the agents
more aggressive and hence the deviation even less proﬁtable. Finally, when either r>r ∗, or r = r∗
and Θ(x) ∩ Θ∗∗ = ∅, necessarily Θ(x) ⊆ Θ(r). Take then any beliefs such that µ(0|x,r)=0for
x ≥ x and µ(0|x,r)=1otherwise. Given these beliefs and the deﬁnition of X, the strategy of the
agents is indeed sequentially rational. QED
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Online Appendix
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A1. Negative correlation between the value and the strength of the status quo
Proposition 6 in the paper assumes that the payoﬀ the policy maker enjoys from maintaining the
status quo is positively correlated with (or independent of) its strength. The following example
shows that such a positive correlation is not essential.
Proposition A1. Suppose R(θ,A,r)=θ − A and U (θ,A,r)=v(θ) − A − C (r), where v is not
necessarily monotonic, but satisﬁes v(θ) > 1−r for all θ ∈ [0,1).T h e r ee x i s t sˆ r>rsuch that, for
any r∗ ∈ [r, ˆ r), there is an equilibrium in which the status quo is abandoned if and only if θ<0
and the policy maker sets r∗ for θ ∈ [0,θ∗∗] and r otherwise.









− Ψ−1 (C (ˆ r))
i
















− Ψ−1 (C (r∗))
i
and note that θ∗∗ ≥ 0 for any r∗ < ˆ r and solves Ψ(x∗−θ∗∗
σ )=C (r∗). Finally, let ˆ θ ∈ (0,1) be the
unique solution to Ψ(x∗−ˆ θ
σ )=ˆ θ and observe that θ∗∗ > ˆ θ since Ψ(x∗−θ∗∗
σ ) <θ ∗∗ when r∗ < ˆ r.
We next prove that the following is an equilibrium: the policy maker sets r(θ)=r∗ if θ ∈ [0,θ∗∗]
and r(θ)=r otherwise; agents attack if and only if (x,r) < (x∗,r∗),o rx<x ; and the status quo
is abandoned if and only if θ<0.
1Consider ﬁrst the behavior of the agents. For r = r, beliefs are pinned down by Bayes’ rule
(this is immediate when noise is unbounded, whereas with bounded noise, it follows from the fact







For any (x,r) such that r = r∗ and Θ(x) ∩ [0,θ∗∗] 6= ∅,µis also determined by Bayes’ rule
and satisﬁes µ(0|x,r)=0 . For any (x,r) such that either r = r∗ and Θ(x) ∩ [0,θ∗∗]=∅, or
r>r ∗, Θ(x) ⊆ Θ(r), take any beliefs such that µ(0|x,r∗)=1if x<xand µ(0|x,r∗)=0
otherwise. Finally, for any r ∈ (r,r∗), note that [0,θ∗∗] ∩ Θ(r)=∅. Then take any beliefs such
that µ(ˆ θ|x,r) >ri fa n do n l yi fx<x ∗ and µ({θ ∈ Θ(x) ∩ Θ(r)}|x,r)=0if Θ(x) * Θ(r). Given
these beliefs, the strategy of the agents is sequentially rational for any (x,r).
Consider next the policy maker. Given the strategy of the agents, it is optimal to set either
r or r∗. The payoﬀ from setting r is zero for θ ≤ ˆ θ and v(θ) − Ψ(x∗−θ
σ ) for θ>ˆ θ, whereas the
payoﬀ from setting r∗ is negative for θ<0 and v(θ)−C (r∗) for θ ≥ 0. Since Ψ(x∗−θ∗∗
σ )=C (r∗) ≤
C(ˆ r) < 1 − r <v(θ), it follows that r∗ i so p t i m a li fa n do n l yi fθ ∈ [0,θ∗∗], which completes the
proof. QED
The above result assumes that v is suﬃciently high. Multiplicity, however, survives even if v
is negative for all θ : there exists a continuum of equilibria in which an intermediate set of θ who
would maintain the status quo even by setting r, prefer to raise the policy at r∗, because the cost
of the policy is lower than that of the attack at r (i.e., C (r∗) ≤ A(θ,r)). These equilibria diﬀer
with respect to both the level of the policy and the regime outcome.
A2. Incomplete information vs common knowledge
In this section we analyze the variant of the benchmark model in which V satisﬁes VθA ≥ 0 and
limθ→∞[V (θ,0)−V (θ,1)] = 0 and ψ is log-concave and strictly positive over R. The purpose of the
exercise here is to contrast the set of equilibrium outcomes sustained under incomplete information
with that under common knowledge.
First, we prove the analogues of Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition A2. (i) There exists an inactive-policy equilibrium in which r(θ)=r for all θ, agents
attack if and only if x<˜ x, and D(θ)=1if and only if θ<˜ θ, where ˜ θ solves V (˜ θ,1−r)=0and
˜ x = ˜ θ +σΨ−1 (1 − r). (ii) For any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r], there exist unique θ∗ ∈ (0,˜ θ], θ∗∗ ≥ θ∗,a n dx∗ ∈ R,
2and an active-policy equilibrium in which r(θ)=r∗ if θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗] and r(θ)=r otherwise, agents
attack if and only if x<xor (x,r) < (x∗,r∗),a n dD(θ)=1if and only if θ<θ ∗.
Proof. Part (i) follows from the same arguments as in Proposition 2. Thus consider part (ii). Fix
an arbitrary r∗ >rand let θ∗ > 0 be the unique solution to V (θ∗,0) = C (r∗).N e x t , f o r a n y















and let B (θ∗,θ◦◦) ≡ Ψ(
X(θ∗,θ◦◦)−θ◦◦
σ ).B(θ∗,θ◦◦) is decreasing in θ◦◦ with maximal value B (θ∗,θ∗)=
1 − r. Next, let
G(θ∗,θ◦◦) ≡ V (θ◦◦,0) − V (θ◦◦,B(θ∗,θ◦◦)) − V (θ∗,0)
G(θ∗,θ◦◦) is decreasing in θ◦◦ (by the assumptions that VA < 0 <V θ,V θA ≥ 0, and the monotonic-
ity of B), with G(θ∗,θ∗)=−V (θ∗,1 − r) and G(θ∗,∞)=−V (θ∗,0) < 0 (by the limit condition).
It follows that a solution to G(θ∗,θ◦◦)=0is unique whenever it exists; and it exists if and
only if G(θ∗,θ∗) ≥ 0, or equivalently θ∗ ≤ ˜ θ (i.e., r∗ ≤ ˜ r). Let then θ∗∗ be this solution and
x∗ = X (θ∗,θ∗∗). With (x∗,θ∗,θ∗∗) deﬁned as above, the rest of the proof follows from the same
arguments as in Proposition 3. QED
Next, we show that the equilibria identiﬁed above exhaust the set of equilibrium outcomes.
When no r 6= r is played in equilibrium, we have the pooling equilibrium; hence, in what follows,
we consider equilibria in which r(θ) >rfor some θ.
Proposition A3. In any equilibrium in which {θ : r(θ) >r } 6= ∅,t h e r ei sr∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r] such that
the following hold: r(θ)=r∗ for all θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗] and r(θ)=r otherwise; agents do not attack
when they observe r = r∗ and attack if and only if x<x ∗ when they observe r = r; D(θ)=1if
and only if θ<θ ∗; the thresholds (x∗,θ∗,θ∗∗) are unique and deﬁned as in Proposition A2.
Proof. We prove this claim with a series of Lemmas.
Lemma A1. There is at most one r∗ 6= r such that r(θ)=r∗ whenever r(θ) 6= r.
Proof. Since raising the policy and abandoning the regime is strictly dominated for all θ,a n yr>r
that is played in equilibrium by some θ must lead to no regime change for this θ. But since the noise
is unbounded, any θ c a ne n s u r en oa t t a c kb yp l a y i n gs u c ha nr. And since C is strictly increasing,
there can be at most one such r played in equilibrium. ¤
We henceforth ﬁxs o m er∗ >rand consider the set of equilibria in which r∗ is played. Given
such an equilibrium, let I (θ) be an indicator of whether θ raises the policy (i.e., I (θ)=0if
3r(θ)=r and I (θ)=1if r(θ)=r∗) and, provided {θ : I (θ)=1 } 6= ∅,l e tθ0 =i n f{θ : I (θ)=1 }
and θ00 =s u p{θ : I (θ)=1 }.
Lemma A2. An equilibrium with r∗ >rexists only if r∗ ≤ ˜ r and satisﬁes θ∗ ≤ θ0 ≤ θ00 ≤ θ∗∗.
Proof.C l e a r l y ,I (θ)=0for any θ<θ ∗. Moreover, limθ→∞ [V (θ,0) − V (θ,1)] = 0 ensures that
V (θ,0) − V (θ,1) <C (r∗) and therefore I (θ)=0for θ suﬃciently high. Hence, whenever
{θ : I (θ)=1 } 6= ∅, necessarily θ∗ ≤ θ0 ≤ θ00 < ∞.
Since any θ>θ ∗ can always set r∗, face no attack, and ensure a payoﬀ V (θ,0) − C(r∗) > 0,
necessarily D(θ)=0for all θ>θ ∗.L e tδ(x) denote the probability conditional on x that θ<θ ∗
and D(θ)=0and p(x) the probability conditional on x that θ ∈ [θ∗,θ00] and r(θ)=r. Then, the
posterior probability of regime change conditional on x and r is
1 − Ψ(x−θ∗















µ(D =1 |x,r) ≤ r and therefore A(θ,r) ≤ Ψ(
X(θ∗,θ00)−θ
σ ) for any θ.






























, or equivalently G
¡
θ∗,θ00¢
≥ 0. But if r∗ > ˜ r, we
know by the proof of Claim 1 that G(θ∗,θ) < 0 for all θ ≥ θ∗, which gives a contradiction and




≥ 0 together with the deﬁnition of θ∗ implies G
¡
θ∗,θ00¢
≥ 0=G(θ∗,θ∗∗);and since G
is decreasing in its second argument, we conclude that θ00 ≤ θ∗∗. ¤
Lemma A3. D(θ)=1for all θ<θ ∗,D (θ)=0for all θ>θ ∗, and θ0 = θ∗.
Proof.I fr∗ is played in equilibrium, it is necessary that agents do not attack whenever they observe
r = r∗ and that their beliefs and strategies are such that the policy maker never ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to deviate to r/ ∈ {r,r∗}. Construct then a sequence {xk,θk}
∞
k=0 as follows: let θ0 =0 ;for k ≥ 0, let
xk solve 1 − Ψ(xk−θk
σ )=r and θk+1 =m i n {θ∗,θ0
k+1}, where θ0




σ )) = 0.
This sequence is increasing and bounded from above; since V and Ψ are continuous, it converges
to (x∞,θ∞), where θ∞ =m i n {θ∗,˜ θ} = θ∗ (since r∗ ≤ ˜ r) and x∞ = θ∗ + σΨ−1 (1 − r). Note that
D(θ)=1for θ<θ 0(= 0),D(θ)=0for θ ≥ θ∗, and I (θ)=0for θ<θ ∗. Consider any k ≥ 0 and
suppose D(θ)=1for all θ<θ k. The posterior probability of regime change given signal x and









−∞ [1 − I (θ)] 1
σψ(x−θ
σ )dθ
≥ 1 − Ψ(x−θk
σ ),
implying that it is optimal for the agent to attack whenever x<x k. But if agents attack whenever
x<x k, A(θ,r) ≥ Ψ(xk−θ
σ ) and therefore for any θ<θ k+1, D(θ)=1if θ sets r = r. By induction
then, D(θ)=1for all θ<θ ∗.
If r∗ =˜ r, then θ∗ = θ∗∗ = ˜ θ and therefore also θ0 = θ00 = ˜ θ. For any r∗ < ˜ r, on the other
hand, we have θ∗ < ˜ θ, which together with the deﬁnition of ˜ θ and x∞, gives V (θ∗,Ψ(x∞−θ∗
σ )) <
V (˜ θ,Ψ(x∞−θ∗
σ )) = V (˜ θ,1 − r)=0 . By the continuity of V and Ψ then, there is δ>0 such that
V (θ,Ψ(x∞−θ
σ )) < 0 for all types θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗ + δ); and since V (θ,0) >C(r∗) for any θ>θ ∗, these
types necessarily set r∗, which proves that θ0 = θ∗.¤
So far we have established that, in any equilibrium in which r∗ is played, r(θ)=r∗ only if
θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗]. It remains to show that r(θ)=r∗ for all θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗].
Lemma A4. If a(x,r) is decreasing in x,t h e nθ00 = θ∗∗ and r(θ)=r∗ for all θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗].























and therefore an agent attacks if and only x<X
¡
θ∗,θ00¢
, with m and X deﬁned as in the
proof of Claim 1. This in turn implies that A(θ,r)=Ψ(
X(θ∗,θ00)−θ
σ ) and therefore θ00 must solve
V (θ00,Ψ(
X(θ∗,θ00)−θ




− C(r∗), or equivalently G
¡
θ∗,θ00¢
=0 . But, by the deﬁnition of
θ∗∗ and the monotonicity of G, G
¡
θ∗,θ00¢
=0i fa n do n l yi fθ00 = θ∗∗. ¤
Lemma A5. If ψ is log-concave, a(x,r) is decreasing in x.



































































which holds if ψ0/ψ is decreasing (i.e., if ψ is log-concave). The monotonicity of µ(θ ≤ θ∗|x,r) then
implies monotonicity of a(x,r). ¤
Combining Lemmas A1-A5 completes the proof. QED
Finally, contrast the above result with the equilibrium outcomes sustainable under common
knowledge (σ =0 ) .A n yp o l i c yr(θ) such that C (r(θ)) ≤ V (θ,0) for θ ∈ [0,1] and r(θ)=r other-
wise can be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Moreover, the regime outcome is indeterminate
for any θ ∈ [0,1).
We conclude that incomplete information reduces the set of equilibrium outcomes as compared
to common knowledge. This may permit interesting predictions: no θ>˜ θ abandons the status quo
and the range of policy intervention vanishes when σ → 0.
A3. Noise in the policy maker’s observation of θ
In this appendix, we consider the case where the policy maker has imperfect information about
the fundamentals: in stage 1, the policy maker does not observe θ; instead, she receives a signal
y = θ + ηε, where η>0 parametrizes the quality of her information and ε is bounded noise, with
support [−1,1], absolutely continuous c.d.f. G, and p.d.f. g.
That policy inaction can be sustained as an equilibrium is straightforward. We next show that
any of the active-policy equilibria of Proposition 3 (where η =0 )can be approximated by an
equilibrium in the game with η>0. Hence, not only multiplicity survives, but also the same type
of equilibria pertain.
Proposition A5. For any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r), there exists ¯ η>0 such that for all η<¯ η, there exist
¡
y0,y00,x 0,θ0¢
and an equilibrium in which r(y)=r∗ if y ∈ [y0,y00] and r(y)=r otherwise, agents




→ (θ∗,θ∗∗,x ∗,θ∗), where the latter are deﬁned as in Proposition 3.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the policy maker. Given the strategy of the agents, any r 6= {r,r∗} is clearly
dominated by either r or r∗. Now, suppose that, conditional on y0, regime change occurs with
certainty if the policy maker sets r, whereas conditional on y00, the probability of regime change
6when setting r is zero. This is the case if and only if y0 +η<θ # ≤ y00 −η, where θ# is the solution
to θ# = Ψ(x0−θ#
σ ). Then deﬁne y0 and y00 by the following:














η )dθ is strictly decreasing in y for any y ∈ R if ξ
has unbounded support; if ξ is bounded, E[A(θ,r)|y] is strictly decreasing in y for y/ ∈ [x0 − σ −
η,x0 + σ + η], E[A(θ,r)|y]=1for y ≤ x0 − σ − η, and E[A(θ,r)|y]=0for y ≥ x0 + σ + η.
Since 0 <C(r∗) ≤ C (˜ r)=˜ θ<1, as o l u t i o nt oE[A(θ,r)|y00]=C(r∗), or equivalently (4), exists
and is unique irrespectively of whether ξ is bounded or unbounded. As long as y0 − η>0 and
y0 + η<θ # ≤ y00 − η, which — as we prove below — hold for η small enough, the proposed strategy
f o rt h ep o l i c ym a k e ri so p t i m a l . I fξ is bounded, suppose further |y00 − y0| < 2σ, which again we
will hold for η small enough.
Next, consider the behavior of the agents. When r = r, beliefs are pinned down by Bayes rule;
since y0 + η<θ # ≤ y00 − η, the posterior probability of regime change for an agent with private
signal x is


























































Note that P1 (x;y0) is decreasing in x,w h i l eP2 (x;y00) is increasing in x, implying that Pr(y ≤ y0|x,r)
is decreasing in x.M o r e o v e r ,Pr(y ≤ y0|x,r) → 1 as x →− ∞and Pr(y ≤ y0|x,r) → 0 as x → +∞,
which ensures the existence of a unique solution to (5) given y0 and y00.








7Since P1 (x;C (r∗)) is decreasing in x, with limx→−∞ P (x;C (r∗)) = 1 and limx→+∞ P (x;C (r∗)) =





σ ). From the continuity of P1 in η, it is then immediate that
x0 → x∗ as η → 0, in which case θ# → ˆ θ, E[A(θ,r)|y00] → Ψ(
x∗−y00
σ ), and y00 → θ∗∗. Along with
y0 = C(r∗)=θ∗, this implies that there exists ¯ η>0 such that η<¯ η suﬃces for a solution to
(3), (4) and (5) to exist and satisfy y0 − η>0,y 0 + η<θ # <y 00 − η, and, when ξ is bounded,
|y00 − y0| < 2σ.
Finally, for out-of-equilibrium events, take any beliefs that satisfy the following: for r ∈ (r,r∗),
µ(θ#|x,r) >ri fa n do n l yi fx<x 0;f o rr>r ∗ or, in the case of bounded noise,r= r∗ and
x/ ∈ [y0 − σ,y00 + σ],µ (0|x,r)=1if x<xand µ(0|x,r)=0otherwise. Given these beliefs the
strategy of the agents is sequentially rational. QED
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